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
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IN THE HEMISPHERE**



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by

Dr. Caesar D. Sereseres

11 November 1977

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FOREWORD

This paper was presented at the Military Policy Symposium sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute, and held at the US Army War College in early 1977. Under the general theme "Inter-American Security and the United States," a broad range of issues affecting US relations in the Latin American region were addressed. This paper examines some of the perceptions, conditions, and government policies which, in the author's opinion, have contributed to the straining of security and military relations between the United States and Latin America.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a forum for the timely dissemination of analytical papers such as those presented at the 1977 Military Policy Symposium.

This memorandum is being published as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. The data and opinions presented are those of the author and in no way imply the endorsement of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

DeWitt C. Smith, Jr.

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant
1 June 1977

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. CAESAR D. SERESERES is currently Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Sciences at the University of California, Irvine. He earned both his master's degree and doctorate in political science at the University of California. His research specialization has been in the areas of US-Latin American military relations, the transfer of conventional arms to nonindustrial nations, and US-Mexico border relations. Dr. Sereseres has been a consultant to the RAND Corporation on matters pertaining to the impact of US military assistance programs on recipient countries.

THE FUTURE OF US MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE HEMISPHERE

The US Government must face two significant issues in its military relations with Latin America. First, each country will seek to acquire the necessary military hardware and supplies it deems essential for the protection of national interests. Second, the provision or denial of such military items has become a troublesome instrument of US foreign policy. Like it or not, in one way or another, the transfer of armaments will continue to adversely affect relations—especially security and military-related relations—between the United States and the majority of the countries in the Latin American region.

Historically, the armed forces of Latin America have depended upon the United States and Western Europe for needed weapons, equipment, and training. Until World War II, arms were obtained primarily from European countries; however, by the end of the War, the United States had become the predominant supplier of most types of military equipment. With the transfer of American arms, US doctrine, training, and advice gained a stronger role in the development of the Latin American armed forces. By the late 1960's, however, a sharp shift began to occur. Numerous Latin American countries began to turn toward European suppliers. Although the United States continued to

supply military equipment and spare parts, arms supply relations between Latin America and the United States gradually deteriorated. For the past decade US arms transfer policies have caused considerable criticism in Latin America for being restrictive and interventionist in tone, while the same policies have been criticized in the United States for being ineffective and/or supportive of repressive governments.

Current trends suggest that for the remainder of the 1970's, US arms policies will remain controversial and undoubtedly play a significant role in relations between the United States and Latin America. What is evident is that US arms policies concerning Latin America continue to be grounded in mythologies which generate controversy and absorb government time and energy as US policymakers attempt to reconcile competing interests. This, despite the fact that the US portion of the Latin American arms market is relatively small. When compared to other areas of the world, the proportion of US security assistance going to the Latin American region is virtually insignificant. For example: during the 1973-75 period, Latin America represented 2 percent of the grant military assistance program, 2 percent of foreign military sale orders, 12 percent of foreign military sale credits, 4 percent of commercial sales, and received but 3 percent of grant excess defense articles from the inventories of the US services.¹ Between 1966 and 1975 US arms accounted for about 32 percent of the total arms transferred into the Latin American region: in the early 1960's the United States provided 40 percent of the total, but by the 1975-76 period the US share had dropped to 15 percent.

The basic foreign policy dilemma facing the United States is how to continue to effectively pursue US national interests in Latin America while segments of the government rely on punitive policies in the attempt to influence the behavior of governments in the hemisphere (Latin American governments view it as an effort to *impose* unacceptable standards). Because many of the Latin American governments are military-dominated (and most likely will remain so for the remainder of the 1970's), current attitudes prevailing within the US government, media, and public may well stimulate a quasi-ideological reaction to "military dictatorships," if not to the Latin American region as a whole. Such trends suggest the return of a *paternalistic* mood toward Latin America which would take the form of *antimilitarism*. Thus, the manner in which US arms policy and military representation is managed for the region of Latin America will strongly influence the intensity of diplomatic and military alienation in the Western Hemisphere.

The specific intent of this essay is to briefly examine some of the perceptions, conditions, and government policies which have contributed to the straining of security and military relations between the United States and Latin America. Special attention will focus on (1) the uncertain relationship between the transfer of US arms and supplies and the enhancement of US national security; (2) the US attempt to influence the acceptance of a human rights "code of behavior" by linking the effort to the provision of arms; (3) the growth of military nationalism in the region; and, (4) the need to evolve a military diplomacy program that can help manage the strains and changes in US-Latin American military relations.

US-LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONS: ARMS TRANSFERS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The range of questions that are suggested from an examination of military assistance and arms sales policies are rather numerous. One question, however, appears central to one aspect of the foreign policy debate: Does the transfer of arms to Latin America enhance the national security of the United States? The answers have eluded academicians and government policymakers alike. The difficulty arises from the fact that the consequences and impact of security assistance may be uncertain—that is, the political benefits are often short-lived and the economic and psychological costs unknown, usually unintended, and generally long range. However, of greater consequence is the uncertainty and ambiguity of events taking place in Latin America that are often beyond the management capabilities of local governments and even to a greater extent, the United States.²

Despite these limitations, several questions need to be addressed, if only for practical policy planning reasons. Questions that are fundamental to a better understanding of current and future military relations in the hemisphere include: Is US *security* enhanced or *influence* obtained via specific forms of military relations? How much political leverage does military assistance offer the United States with a recipient country in Latin America? Further, if we have the analytical capacity to determine if military arms and training make a difference, do we have the same capacity to ascertain which US interests are affected?

Most recently the provision of military hardware to Latin America has usually caused concern because of the possibility of contributing to

arms races, local border conflicts, or the strengthening of military regimes that violate human rights. (In the past, however, US interests in good working relations and in the acquisition of influence and leverage seemed to require that the United States engage in competitive marketing and preemptive selling in the effort to minimize the quality and quantity of Latin American arms purchases from "third countries.") During the last decade, US arms transfer policies have been complicated by the lessening of US presence in the region, the continuing effort by Latin America to diversify relations, the likelihood of conflict rather than cooperation between Latin American countries, and the repressive and authoritarian practices of several countries in the region. Under these circumstances, a standardized set of criteria for military relations and arms transfer decisions was made virtually impossible—despite the persistent efforts of the US government. The most apparent pattern that seems to emerge from three decades of security assistance to Latin America has been the temporal nature of diplomatic benefit and the uncertainty of the consequences in the transfer of arms to the region.³

As has already been suggested, the link between the provision of arms and military services and US national security is vague and ambiguous. Unless one assumes that "stability," access to raw materials, and contact with local militaries is by definition enhancing the national interest and a reflection of influence, then one must be prepared to critically examine much of the conceptual framework of military relations between the United States and Latin America. To view arms sales as a diplomatic tool for *influence*, considerably more knowledge is necessary concerning the decision-making processes of recipient countries. The uncertainties and complexities of events in Latin America and the lack of an agreed-upon criteria to evaluate the consequences of security assistance makes an assessment of the degree of influence that the United States gains from the transfer of arms suspect. Defining, as well as actually identifying, cases of influence as a direct result of security assistance is difficult and can often be misleading. For that matter, the influence of small allies and friends in a security assistance relationship is often overlooked—often to the detriment of US interests and foreign policy objectives.⁴

The concern for seeking influence via a military relationship raises a further conceptual problem—namely, the debate over the extent to which security assistance should be based on *valid military requirements* or on the concern for *political influence and leverage*.

Often, the United States has appeared to be considering the psychological needs of a particular regime and/or military institution, regardless of the merit of the military requirements for such arms. The concern for *political good will* frequently becomes the principal (although unspoken) rationale in the provision of arms.

The concern for the maintenance of political good will with the armed forces and military regimes of the region led the United States to what eventually became nothing more than a preemptive arms transfer policy in most cases. The preemptive rationale consisted of the following assumptions: (1) if the United States refused to respond to a military request, arm suppliers not concerned with US interests would provide the military items; (2) other countries were frequently seen as being more effective in utilizing an arms supply relationship at the expense of the United States; and (3) Latin American countries were believed vulnerable to the pressures and intrigues of arms-selling countries (non-Communist as well as Communist). Latin American countries, once exposed to "third country" military hardware, training, and advisors were thus seen as somehow adversely affecting US security interests and incapable of protecting their own national interests.

However, by mid-1977, newly legislated congressional restrictions and arms transfer policy guidelines enacted under the Carter Administration have made it virtually impossible to call upon the preemptive arguments as justification for future arms transfers to the Latin American region. In fact, White House, State Department and congressional statements suggest that not only is the United States no longer worried about "losing influence" to "third country" arms suppliers, but that the United States is prepared to try to use security assistance as an instrument of influence in pursuing human rights objectives. For some segments of the government and public it would be a diplomatic failure if the United States did not attempt to utilize what many believe to be the region's *military dependency* (maintenance and logistic support for US equipment) as a means to influence the manner in which Latin American governments—especially military regimes—treat their citizens.⁵ This turn of events was at first not understood and eventually not tolerated by the regimes to which the criticism was directed.

There is one final consideration in assessing the linkage between arms transfers and US security. Substantial evidence exists to suggest that military assistance to Latin American countries can result in improving the quality and performance of the armed forces. However,

providing arms and training has seldom been apolitical.⁶ It has been virtually impossible for the United States to exercise control over the political consequences of security assistance. Nevertheless, we are still confronted with the proposition that while the influence and security derived from providing military assistance is seldom commensurate with the assistance provided, it has proven just as difficult to determine the costs to the United States of not providing security assistance.

Thus, the assessment of future security assistance relationships between the United States and Latin America should take into account not only a realistic determination of what is attainable, but also an evaluation of the unintended political consequences—including undesirable involvement in domestic and regional politics and unwanted identification with repressive regimes. The capacity to attempt the reformulation of Inter-American security relations will be largely influenced by the *ideological* and *psychological* inclinations of US decisionmakers toward institutions, personalities, and events in Latin America. More frequently than not, critics as well as proponents of US-Latin American military relations have tended to regress to solutions largely determined by ideological predispositions. The US concern for the protection of human rights abroad is illustrative of this problem.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILITARY RELATIONS: A NEW CODE OF BEHAVIOR?

With the increased presence of military governments in Latin America (reaching an apex with the Chilean military coup which literally destroyed the regime of Salvador Allende in 1973) and the intensified efforts of governments throughout the region to deal with terrorists, the US Congress took the lead in the mid-1970's to examine the relationship between US foreign policy and the violation of human rights in Latin America. Congressional hearings on the status of human rights in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Central America eventually led to the termination of grant and credit assistance to Chile and Uruguay. The past few years of congressional-executive branch debates on the subject of arms sales and human rights makes it quite evident that for the remainder of the decade the future of US-Latin American military relations will be greatly affected by the disillusionment that exists in Congress—fostered and supported by the media and various private interest groups—with US foreign assistance programs and with the behavior of the Latin American armed forces.

At the base of the current debate over human rights conditions in Latin America is the extent to which basic American political values should be reflected in this country's foreign policy.⁷ Injecting American values and morality into US foreign policy has come to mean avoiding entangling relationships with repressive military regimes and promoting human rights in every country of the region. One such entangling relationship is reflected in the image that the United States is the "arms merchant," or worse, the exporter of "tools of repression" for Latin America.⁸ However, for others, arms sales and security assistance relationships are necessary foreign policy instruments for the defense of "friendly" countries and, thus, in the best interests of the United States. These proponents of arms transfers generally downplay the fact that security assistance relationships do in fact identify the United States with regimes whose citizens have been subjected to personal violence and inhumane treatment.

In the effort to gain a larger role in the administration of security assistance, the Congress has legislated numerous restrictions in amending the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act.⁹ Included in these restrictive efforts have been a yearly ceiling on total military sales, the gradual elimination of grant assistance and military missions, the prohibition of security assistance to a country found in gross violation of human rights or practicing discriminatory policies, and the subjection of arms sales over \$25 million to congressional approval.

Congressional, and now White House, pursuit to promote human rights has come to severely constrain military relationships between the United States and Latin America. The efforts taken to terminate grant assistance and military assistance advisory teams, to gradually limit military training, and to eventually eliminate credit assistance, cannot only be seen as an attempt to disassociate the United States from military regimes but also to disrupt formal relations with military institutions in Latin America. One need not be reminded that current concern for human rights abroad is much in keeping with US efforts in the early 1960's to suspend assistance and/or recognition for the purpose of *influencing* a regime to maintain liberal democratic practices. Such paternalistic measures, however, proved to be ineffective.¹⁰ Past experiences suggest that the curtailment of military sales or economic assistance may have minimal impact on a regime's desire or ability to protect human rights. In practice, the restrictions will be easiest to implement against countries such as Chile, Uruguay,

Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua—countries which continue to attract the attention of congressional scrutiny.¹¹

Obviously, problems exist in attempting to use military and economic assistance as a lever to influence the behavior of other governments. As yet undetermined are the qualitative and quantitative factors that might trigger an assistance cutoff and what it is that in fact constitutes *official and gross* violation of human rights. Complicating the assessment of human rights conditions in Latin America is the fact that human rights conditions are invariably a function of the overall internal security situation—thus, the official, governmental attitude toward violence in general tends to govern national practices in the treatment of individuals. Furthermore, the repressive tactics of governments in their campaigns against rural guerrillas and urban terrorists are often, some would argue, a reflection of weak and corrupt legislative and judicial systems. Thus, the repressive measures that are frequently resorted to, it is further argued, are often the only effective instruments in the pursuit of internal order and stability—given the weaknesses of national institutions.

The basic foreign policy dilemma facing the United States is how to continue to effectively pursue US national interests in Latin America while developing a nonpunitive approach to the promotion of increased observance of human rights. The danger is that as US relations with Latin America become increasingly inflexible—be it regarding congressional restrictions on security assistance or the linking of the provision of economic-financial assistance to human rights conditions—other countries, with fewer inhibitions, will more than likely be prepared to provide military equipment to the region. Israeli military sales to Central America and the attempt to sell Kfir fighter aircraft to Ecuador and the USSR's willingness to heavily subsidize military sales to Peru demonstrate the capacity of other countries to take advantage of US inflexibilities.

In response to the concern of some congressmen regarding the consequences of American unresponsiveness to arms requests, Secretary of State Vance, in February 1977 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, stated that the Carter Administration recognized and accepted the "risk" of permitting further Soviet penetration of Latin America through arms sales. He noted that the possibility of such setbacks represented a "risk that we are going to have to take."¹²

The US emphasis on human rights and Latin America's concern for

internal security are both eroded by the increasing unmanageability of events in the region—i.e., population growth, rural migration to the cities, urban crime and congestion, active and armed groups of both left and right, and persistent rural poverty. It should, therefore, not be unsettling to the United States to see countries in Latin America experiment politically and economically to solve national development problems. Some of these countries may well choose nondemocratic and non-capitalist forms of political and economic experimentation. The United States, however, should not consider such events as either a threat to its “security” or “democratic ideals.” The United States must be prepared to accept, as well as tolerate, disorder and instability as the experimentation and frequent failure of social change and development takes place. A foreign policy focusing on the goal of “democratic” or “humanistic” governments abroad in such a regional environment is fraught with the seeds of failure.

At least for the remainder of the 1970's, economic and security assistance programs will remain the principal vehicle through which the United States can raise the question of human rights violations. In the face of this, the use of repressive tactics for counterterrorist purposes may periodically provoke a rigid reaction from the United States in the name of human rights. Thus, the continued persistence of military regimes, combined with reliance on torture, assassination, and imprisonment in dealing with subversive groups, could plunge the late 1970's into an era of recrimination and alienation between the United States and Latin America. At this point in time, however, the impact of terminating security assistance to Chile and Uruguay, and the rejection by Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador, and Guatemala of any grant, credit, and cash transactions which are subject to human rights review by the United States, remains unknown.

REDEFINING SECURITY RELATIONS: THE RETURN TO TRADITIONAL MILITARY DIPLOMACY

The issues associated with US-Latin American military relations, as well as the costs and benefits of security assistance as an instrument in foreign policy, are much more political than military or economic. In addition, the apparent concern for maintaining US military prestige in Latin America may not be as serious an issue as generally thought. The United States is too large and economically powerful, regardless of the military hardware and services it can offer, to be ignored by Latin

American countries. "Prestige" may be an altogether meaningless and costly issue. Furthermore, the *limits* of US security assistance to Latin America often go unrecognized because of the failure to realize the extent to which military resources can be used by local political actors. Over the decades, numerous Latin American countries have been able to manipulate American commitments and resources as a means to develop a US interest in the regime's survival. In short, the *security* rhetoric utilized to justify arms transfers to Latin American countries is a major contributor to the weaknesses in not only policy evaluation, but also in exploring options in military relations.¹³ The need to reformulate military relations between the United States and Latin America will require extensive inquiry into (1) the after-effects of a Panama Canal resolution; (2) a diplomatic "opening" to Castro's Cuba; and (3) the demise of institutionalized "anti-Communism" as the common mode of political communication in Inter-American security relations. Given these significant changes in Inter-American relations, the basic assumption of a US-Latin American military relationship should be that it is good diplomacy to have working relations with major national institutions in the hemisphere. The military is one of these major national institutions. However, a US military policy need not have to justify or rationalize an on-going relationship or program in terms of threat or influence. This is not necessary for effective military diplomacy. More importantly, the fact that the United States maintains working relations (to the extent desired by the Latin American country) with a military institution does not preclude the possibility of communicating human rights concerns or any other US foreign policy concern that may arise.

A revitalized US military diplomacy should:

- deal with Latin American governments as governments—regardless of the extent of military participation;

- continue the program of military sales, allow credit for only large end-items, lessen the restrictive nature of arms sale policy, and seek to overcome the inertia existing within the arms transfer bureaucracy—especially as it pertains to requests from the smaller Latin American countries;

- "modernize" the US military training program—curtail combat type training (most Latin American military institutions have this capability), focus US training programs at the higher officer and NCO levels and in course content deal with helicopter and transport operations, administration, management, logistics, resources management, higher education, and intellectual/professional exchanges;

- concentrate on officer exchange programs at the War College and Command and General Staff levels for periods of 2-3 years; and,

- maintain 3-5 member US defense Cooperation Teams whose presence would be negotiated with each country desiring such a relationship with the United States. The Defense Cooperation Teams, with additional members to be contracted for by the host country for needed technical specialties, should consist of mostly Foreign Area Officers (FAO's) with the necessary language, cultural acculturation, and familiarization with the country required for effective military diplomacy. The functions of each member might fall into the following areas: one senior officer to act as counterpart to the host country's Minister of Defense and General Staff; a logistics officer who could act as a "broker" to facilitate the acquisition of US military items and services; and a politico-military area specialist responsible for reporting on military affairs and for providing English instruction at military academies and senior officer colleges. Such a military representation system would hopefully enable the Department of Defense to more effectively utilize FAO's and reward them, i.e., by way of promotion, for their basically "nonmilitary" training as military diplomats.¹⁴

What I suggest is that effective and mutually beneficial military relations can be based on less than a security rationale. The maintenance of good working relations with a vital Latin American national institution is of itself a worthwhile foreign policy objective to pursue. Unfortunately, some US attitudes and policies regarding arms transfers to Latin America have generally contributed to the deterioration of US-Latin American relations over the past decade. Punitive measures—be they in the area of arms restrictions or human rights—have stimulated elements of military nationalism and resentment of US paternalism and moralism. The American lack of response in the area of military hardware has tended to adversely affect Latin American judgments about US responsiveness in other policy areas—especially in cases where countries are governed by military regimes (in 1977 there were 16 governments formally headed by military officers or strongly influenced by the armed forces).

This is not to suggest, however, that the United States should engage in promotional arms transfer policies. Such an effort could be just as counterproductive. A reformulated arms sale philosophy should lessen the restrictive as well as the promotional pressures existing within the US government and private sector. Such a policy of arms transfers would enhance US capacity to meet Latin American requests and needs

in the face of international competition. Only in this manner can the United States avoid continued strained relations with Latin American countries, especially since arms sales, at least from the perspective of the United States, are largely marginal to American national interests in the region. The United States has little to gain from an aggressive arms program. However, the United States can only contribute to continuing problems in hemispheric bilateral relations by engaging in restrictive and punitive policies which mainly serve to discriminate against Latin American countries—especially those countries whose governmental leadership is drawn from the officer corps of the region's armed forces.¹⁵

Despite the criticism and disapproval by the US Congress, media, and academic community, the Latin American military will continue to play a significant political role in most Latin American nations. Although professionalization of the military continues, this has not brought about less military involvement in the administration of government or military influence in the determination of domestic and foreign policy. Of perhaps greater consequence has been the "rebirth" of military nationalism (not a "militarism" which is so frequently, and erroneously, referred to) among the region's armed forces. As this military nationalism spreads, the possibility increases of stronger "antiforeign" postures as experimentation in national development continues.

Despite several common characteristics among the armed forces in the hemisphere, military diversity is evident—that is, each military institution and military regime must be understood in the context of its individual society. Ideological and policy differences *within* each Latin American military institution will periodically alter the political behavior and government programs of the military. Furthermore, as members of a central political institution, military officers will continue to reevaluate the function of their institution in society. Regardless of the directions of specific political, economic, and social changes, the armed forces will inevitably continue to be politically involved.¹⁶

Given these circumstances of change and uncertainty, a US policy relating to the military in Latin America must therefore be selective, and must of practical necessity focus on bilateral rather than regional policies. The United States, in addition, should be sensitive, though certainly not apologetic nor defensive, to the military nationalism that has grown as a result of domestic and international conditions. While such nationalism may generate less anti-US feeling than would be

evident in the civilian population, it is nevertheless present in the military cultures of Latin America.¹⁷

However, a sensitivity to military nationalism will not of itself provide the necessary policy guidance with regard to a particular country. Recognition of the impossibility of a regional military or arms transfer policy remains imperative, and must in fact be supplemented by an understanding of the severe limits on direct US influence on the internal political role of a particular Latin American military institution. The days when individual US military advisors, military doctrine, and the provision of arms might have influenced the behavior of the military institution are rapidly disappearing—if they have not in fact vanished in such countries as Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil.

CONCLUSIONS: US INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS

Latin America does not present a military threat, conventional or otherwise, to the United States. Nor can it be said that a nonhemispheric power has posed a *military* threat to the United States in Latin America since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The absence of immediate threats to US security in the hemisphere cannot, however, be taken to imply the absence of US security interests in Latin America. Experience suggests that security in an interdependent world cannot be defined in strictly military terms. The growing economic and political importance of such countries as Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, given the shifting balance of world economic power and vulnerabilities, make any simple correlation between "security threat" and "military power" fallacious.

What this suggests is that even the United States cannot afford to disregard the concerns and interests of neighbors. Changing patterns of global communication, increased trade and investment sensitivity, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation have tended to shrink the planet. Geographic proximity remains a critical psychological and, therefore, political-military fact of life. The United States will find it virtually impossible not to maintain at least a residual interest in the security concerns of its neighbors.¹⁸ For example, Cuban involvement in Angola and other African nations has demonstrated to the Latin American military that a conventional threat from the small Caribbean island is in fact a realistic contingency to plan for. Possessing several hundred thousand well-trained troops, some of the most modern

military armaments in the world, and fresh from a hard-fought victorious war thousands of miles from home, Cuba represents an imposing, if not at times convenient, threat to many regimes in the hemisphere. This fear exists despite the fact that Cuba, without Soviet support, lacks the necessary seacraft and aircraft to transport weapons and supplies beyond its territory for large-scale and long-term military operations.

An additional consideration for the United States is the substantial rise in the activities of nonhemispheric nations in Latin America. While these have, until recently, been principally Europe and Japan—powers generally considered friendly to the United States—they also include the Soviet Union and some East European countries.

However, this is not to mean that the conditions of interdependency, geographic proximity or nonhemispheric country activities indicate a present or future threat to US security. Indeed, their uncertain and diverse nature tells us that even if they did, the threat would not be one that could be met by a traditional military response. Taken as a whole, nevertheless, these three conditions do suggest that US military policy and arms transfer programs can serve foreign policy objectives in the region. A revitalized military policy could (1) serve as a mechanism to demonstrate US responsiveness to Latin American conditions and interests; and (2) maintain the professional contact and communication needed for on-going cooperation and future contingencies. These objectives do not require large or concessional security assistance programs. They do, however, call for programs whose content should be both professionally sound and politically defensible. Institutional linkages between the United States and Latin American military forces based on professional liaison, training programs and arms transfers can contribute to these two fundamental objectives in US-Latin American military relations for the remainder of the 1970's.

In seeking to reformulate military and arms transfer policies for Latin America, one must recognize (1) the *limitations* of gaining "influence" and protecting economic interests via security relationships and (2) the *diversity* of military institutions and societal environments in the hemisphere. But, perhaps the greatest error of all will be to ignore or underestimate the strength, capabilities and ingenuity of the Latin American countries and their respective military institutions. While no country individually poses a credible political or military threat to the United States, the likelihood of an unfriendly,

uncooperative, and united Latin America, determined to make use of domestic resources and international pressure tactics as a means to negotiate better treatment from the United States, cannot be totally dismissed.

ENDNOTES

1. Data was tabulated from *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, Data Management Division, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Washington, DC, 1975; and *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Washington, DC, 1976.

2. Material for this section has been drawn from my "U. S. Military Assistance to Non-Industrial Nations: In Pursuit of Security and Influence," in Ellen P. Stern, ed., *The Limits of Military Intervention: Contemporary Dimensions*, Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications, 1977.

3. Satisfactory conclusions have not been reached regarding Latin American military requirements, or the relationship between security assistance programs and regional stability, influence, access to raw materials, keeping the Soviets out, and the protection of American interests. An evaluation of this on-going debate can be found in Luigi R. Einaudi, et al., *Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect*, Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1973.

4. For a closer examination of this phenomenon, see Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, No. 2, Spring, 1971.

5. Congressman Edward I. Koch, a leading human rights advocate and critic of security assistance to Latin America has stated that he hoped the State Department would utilize the ban on military aid to convey US concern about repression in Latin America. He went on to note that "the Uruguayan regime is not alone as the oppressor of its own people. Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and many other nations in Latin America seem to have no regard for the basic human rights of their people. The cutoff of military aid to Uruguay should send a message to those regimes as well." See "Hill Conferees Agree to Koch Amendment Ending Military Assistance to Uruguay," Press Release, US Congress, Washington, DC, September 15, 1976.

6. An insightful review of the impact of military assistance on the Latin American armed forces is provided by John S. Fitch, *The Political Consequences of US Military Assistance to Latin America*, Military Issues Research Memorandum, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, September 15, 1977.

7. Early concern for the issue is to be found in *Arms Sales and Foreign Policy*, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC, 1966. An excellent critique of the conflict between American democratic values and foreign policy necessities is presented by Thomas L. Hughes, "Liberals, Populists, and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, No. 20, Fall 1975, pp. 98-137.

8. Some critics of US arms sales have focused on what is termed "repression technology." The support of police organizations and para-military forces via the provision of small weapons, riot control equipment, surveillance devices, and training to Latin American governments is seen as a form of support for governments engaged in the violation of human rights. An analysis of the sale of "repression technology" is provided by Michael T. Klare and Nancy Stein, "Exporting the Tools of Repression," *The Nation*, October 16, 1976, pp. 365-370.

9. See *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, Hearings before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC, 1976; and *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, Public Law 94-329, H.R. 13680, US Congress, Washington, DC, June 30, 1976.

10. What should be kept in mind, however, is that until the arrival of the Carter Administration, the target of these restrictive amendments was not only Latin America, but the executive branch of the American government. From a variety of views within Congress, the executive branch of government has been lax in utilizing military, economic, and financial assistance to these countries as a means to protect US investments, tuna boats, and democratic government; discourage the purchase of expensive and sophisticated military equipment; and insure human rights. An excellent review of past efforts to dictate behavior via the supposed "leverage" obtained from US assistance programs is provided in Herbert Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972, pp. 260-302.

11. In a May 21, 1977 Los Angeles *Times* article by Tendayi Kumbula entitled, "Human Rights Stressed at L. A. Meetings," Patricia M. Derian, the State Department's Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs declared that, "President Carter is very serious about human rights. This is not a fad. This commitment has become a key element in the consideration of American foreign policy . . . We are concerned about human rights violations wherever they occur." She said the Carter Administration's human rights platform was based on three fundamental principles: (1) the right of a citizen to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and imprisonment; (2) the right to food, shelter, education and health care; and (3) the right to enjoy civil and political liberties including freedom of speech, religion, press, and to move in and out of one's country.

12. Quoted in "Moves on Latin America—Impact on Export Market," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, March 7, 1977, p. 18. Additional information on Soviet and other "third country" military sales efforts in Latin America is provided by Tad Szulc, "Russia Arms Peru," *The New Republic*, February 19, 1977, pp. 18-19.

13. For differing perspectives on the current status of US-Latin American military relations and on the need for policy changes in this sphere of diplomatic relations, see Rolland D. Truitt, "Defining Latin American Security Issues," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 4, December 1976 and Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, *The United States and Latin America: Next Steps*, Center for Inter-American Relations, December 20, 1976.

14. The Foreign Area Officer represents a highly educated elite (40 percent of the FAO's have obtained Master's or Ph.D.'s while the rate in the general officer corps is slightly over 20 percent) of some 2,000 individuals. Low promotion rates and poor assignments suggest that FAO specialization along with one or two Latin American assignments all but terminates any future opportunity for selection to senior service schools and thus, promotion to Colonel and General. In short, the 6-7 years that it takes to adequately prepare an FAO takes the officer out of the promotion "main stream."

15. President Carter's May 19, 1977 statement on "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy" places the burden of persuasion on those who favor a particular

arms sale, rather than on those who oppose it. Such a policy could provide the proper balance between promotional and restrictive pressures. However, the complicating factor for most Latin American countries is not the tightening up of the arms business, but the human rights reports which they find intolerable and a form of intervention in their internal political affairs.

16. Luigi Einaudi's edited *Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future*, New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974, provides a comprehensive examination of the contemporary Latin American political and economic environment. See especially David F. Ronfeldt's "Patterns of Civil-Military Rule" for a closer look at the fragmented and coalition nature of military institutions in the region. Further understanding of the political behavior of the Latin American armed forces is provided by Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," *World Politics*, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, October, 1974.

17. A Latin American phenomenon which now presents a challenge to US interests, though not necessarily security, has been the rise of military intervention and overt military rule. The most significant consequence has been the continual growth in the bureaucratization and militarization of government in Latin America. Such a trend has not prevented the takeover of US investments and properties. For further evidence of this condition see Irving Louis Horowitz and Ellen Kay Trimberger, "State Power and Military Nationalism in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 223-244.

18. For example, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Terence A. Todman has talked about a "new security" concern in the Caribbean. He noted that the United States still has security interests in the Caribbean—describing it as our "third border." Possible conflict between Great Britain and Guatemala over the status of Belize, an unsettled border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, Panama negotiations, Soviet naval operations, expanding Cuban relations, and the undetermined status of Puerto Rico all indicate that while the US presence and role may diminish elsewhere in Latin America, the Caribbean Basin remains of some strategic concern. See "U. S. Relations in the Caribbean," Statement, The Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, June 28, 1977.

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